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Micro-Economics of Quality and Social Construction 
of the Market: Disputes Among the London Leather 
Trades in the Eighteenth-Century 
Philippe Minard ∗ 
Abstract: »Mikroökonomie der Qualität und die soziale Konstruktion des 
Marktes: Dispute unter den Londoner Ledergewerben im 18. Jahrhundert«. 
The London leather market inherited an age-old regulation framework. But 
some harsh disputes among the leather trades in the Eighteenth Century re-
activated the debate about norms and rules. Disputes between butchers, tanners 
and curriers revolved less around the principle of the quality control than 
around its intrinsic definition, leading to a significant shift: the former defini-
tion of quality as an absolute, defined by precise norms (which I call “regulated 
quality”) is challenged by a more flexible definition, the “deliberated quality” 
established by a jury formed by representatives of each trade. Hence quality 
turns out to be a pure convention, grounded on a deliberative process. This 
case study, by approaching norms of quality and certification process from the 
point of view of the actors of the market instead of adopting the former cliché 
of free-market versus regulation and control, sheds light on the need to set a 
new ground to discuss these issues. 
Keywords: 18th century, 19th century, London, leather crafts, trade, norms, 
quality. 
1. Introduction 
The leather trades have long been part of the world of corporate and regulated 
urban trades. Leather crafts offer an apt site of observation to analyze the func-
tions, relevance and transformation of norms and controls within a tightly-
regulated trade framework. In London, as in England as a whole, a law of 1604 
strictly regulated the division of labor between tanners, curriers, shoemakers, 
saddlers, etc. and very precisely defined the rules for the manufacturing and 
sale of leather items (Riello 2006). 
Inside the world of leather and skin production, the greatest concerns about 
quality were focused on the early stages of preparation, at the beginning of the 
chain of manufacturing (cutting up the animals, skin tanning and leather curry-
ing). The issue was that of hidden defects, because the actual quality of the 
material was not always visible or detectable: it all depended on the kind of 
                                                             
∗  Address all communications to: Philippe Minard, Université Paris 8, UMR 8533 CNRS: 
Institutions et dynamiques historiques de l’économie, département d’histoire, 2 rue de la 
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physico-chemical treatment that had been applied in the vat (quality of the tan 
used, duration and temperature of the bath) and could be recognized only later, 
when the material was actually put to use. Regulations were meant to reduce 
this initial uncertainty about quality. In addition, the long chain of distinct 
processes, from early operations such as quartering and cutting up, down to the 
finished product, involved many different workers and thus multiplied the 
occasions to cheat and deceive. 
In London, where 10% of the production (and 10% of the population) was 
concentrated, the fact that authorities repeatedly reissued the same rules in the 
course of the 18th century raises doubts about how successful the system actu-
ally was, and it seems as if a long movement tending towards deregulation was 
slowly imposing itself. A more detailed analysis of the years 1790 to 1810, a 
period of intense discussion, shows that the situation was much more complex. 
On the one hand, the same practitioners who contested the monopolies that 
stemmed from the commercial division of labor and asked for the abolition of 
the 1604 law, also demanded, at the end of the 18th century, new forms of 
quality control on raw materials. On the other hand, beneath the surface of the 
more or less anachronistic obsession with rules displayed by some actors, lie 
major shifts in the very conception of quality control, in the understanding of 
both its practical organization and its economic functions. As we will see 
shortly, there were changing ideas, not only about the stage at which control 
should happen, but also about the very definition of control. In these condi-
tions, the traditional and teleological narrative about the ineluctable victory of 
liberal reason over archaic regulations cannot account for actual transforma-
tions. Instead of describing the usual great clash of grand principles, we should 
offer a more nuanced analysis, focusing on the meaning of norms and on the 
changing definitions of quality (Stanziani 2003; Minard 2011). 
2. Leather Regulations 
Leather items belong to this universe of objects of everyday life that are at the 
core of the “revolution in consumption” in 17th and 18th century England.1 In 
his Annals of Commerce (1805), MacPherson reckoned that in 1783, leather 
was, right after cloth, the second production in value, representing an amount 
of £10.5 million. Leather is everywhere because its uses are many. About 60 to 
70% of its production was used to make boots and shoes, as well as gloves and 
other items. Leather was also an indispensable material for transportation and 
farm work. Finally, in times of war, demand rocketed due to the needs of the 
army and navy. Overall, the average annual production increased about 60% 
between 1750 and 1830. The bulk of this production was made of “coarse 
                                                             
1  This article owes a lot to the reference study: Riello (2006). 
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leathers,” that is cow skins tanned in vats with oak bark for 6 to 24 months. 
After this long treatment, the tanner delivered a raw leather, that had taken on a 
red shade given by the tan, and called “crust leather” because of its cardboard 
aspect. The currier then had to make it strong and flexible, while also rendering 
it waterproof, thanks to various types of greasing (with suet, oil, wax, etc.) and 
mechanical treatment. After these finishing operations, cordwainers or saddlers 
could work the leather (Clarckson 1989). 
Tanneries, because of their great water needs and because of the stench, 
were set up on the outskirts of the city, concentrated on the right bank of the 
Thames, in Southwark and Bermondsey (south-east of Southwark borough). 
Cordwainers lived in the city itself, close to their customers. The strategic 
center of the activity, however, was the great Leadenhall market, in the City. 
On Fridays, tanners would come there to buy green skins from slaughtermen; 
on Tuesdays, they came back to sell their crust leather. 
The primary reason that the Leadenhall market played such a role in the 
London leather trade was that tanners were obliged to have all of their products 
inspected there before they could sell them. 
In the 18th century, the regulatory framework was, for the most part, identi-
cal to the one established at the beginning of the reign of James I by a 1603-4 
law, “an Act concerning tanners, curriers, shoe-makers and other artificers 
occupying the cutting of leather”2, that regulated, until it was definitively abol-
ished in 1808, the manufacturing process, the requirements to practice one’s 
trade, the relationship between the various trades involved, and the practical 
organization of control (Riello 2008). 
The regulatory framework established in 1604 is based on several funda-
mental principles. First, that of the necessary publicity of commercial opera-
tions. When they left the tanneries, crust leathers could only be sold “in open 
fair of market in the places therefore commonly accustomed”: the exhibition of 
products on the “market place” (to borrow Steven Kaplan’s semantic distinc-
tion between the market as abstract principle and the market as physical loca-
tion) seeks to guarantee the transparency of the exchange (Kaplan 1984). The 
goal was to put producers and consumers in a contact as direct and close as 
possible in order to forestall the parasitism of useless intermediaries.3 
Secondly, regulations imposed a strict division of labor and assigned to each 
actor of the field a precisely defined role. The area of competence of each trade 
was delimited and any boundary crossing was strictly forbidden: to tan, curry, 
make shoes, saddles, or leather items were distinct activities that could not be 
practiced concurrently. 
                                                             
2  Act 1 James I, cap. 22, of 1603/4. 
3  On the importance of physically gathering goods on the market place, see also Margairaz 
(1988), 3rd part. 
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Finally, the work in each trade was also regulated by strictly codified rules 
of manufacturing. 
This set of rules was enforced under the supervision of the corporate institu-
tions of the various trades involved. But the tanners were not organized as a 
corporate trade, and without the zealous support of a full-fledged company, 
authorities did not have any institutional partner with whom to discuss. Hence 
the creation of another form of inspection, of a municipal kind, that superim-
posed upon the ordinary control exerted by the wardens of the existing compa-
nies. 
Eight inspectors (among which one was specifically assigned to handle the 
seals, hence the phrase “searchers and sealer”), nominated by the city council 
from a list of names put forward by the companies, were in charge of control-
ling all the tanned leather brought to the market.4 They scrutinized the material, 
recorded its sale price, the names of the seller and buyer, and applied the seal 
that certified the conformity of the goods and authorized its sale. In a case of a 
breach of regulation, the inspectors seized the item and handed it to the six 
“triers of leather” whom the city would have appointed within six days. These 
six “honest and expert men,” equally recruited among “the better sort” of 
cordwainers, curriers and tanners (two triers per trade), then had two to three 
weeks to return a verdict. 
Figure 1: Inspection of Leather in London 
First stage: control and seizure 




Second stage: judgment 





In fact, in the middle of the 18th century, the real power to control was in the 
hands of the searchers and sealer: crust leathers were inspected on the market, 
right after they had gone through the tan pit and before currying. 
                                                             
4  Inspectors acted as if they were representatives of the corporations, pre-selected by their 
respective oligarchies, even though the effective nomination belonged to the city authori-
ties. Thus, companies were fully integrated in the workings of the municipal system of in-
spection, although their power to certify products remained in fact delegated. Tanners how-
ever, because they did not constitute a corporate trade, were sidelined in this area. 
Curriers (put forward by their company) 
Cordwainers (put forward by their company) 
Saddlers (put forward by their company 
Two tanners 
Two curriers (put forward by their company) 
Two cordwainers (put forward by their company 
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3. The Debate on the Leather Inspection 
Periodically, municipal authorities were called on to receive various complaints 
against the inspectors, sometimes deemed too harsh, sometimes too lenient, 
depending on who was the plaintiff. Beginning in the 1790s however, in the 
context of the French Wars, the debate intensified and the number of disputes 
was on the rise. It then seems that tanners had taken up a determined battle to 
obtain the abolition of rules and controls on their production. Should we see 
this as simply the end of an archaic practice, of an outdated conception of the 
market and its rules? 
The issue is much more complicated than that. As we shall indeed see, the 
tanners actually led a battle on two fronts. They wanted to “shake the yoke” of 
measures that were “not only unnecessary but extremely injurious both to 
themselves and to the public”,5 while simultaneously campaigning, with all the 
other actors of the leather field, for the application in London of the laws of 
1800 and 1801, which had imposed everywhere else new forms of quality 
control on the butchers after the cutting up of animals. Two-edged language or 
new variation on the theme of the “two dreams of trading” (liberty and protec-
tion) presented by Jean-Pierre Hirsch (Hirsch 1991)?6 Establishing an inspec-
tion of skins in the capital city in 1803 (within the framework of the Flaying 
Acts) seems to run counter to the liberal conceptions that increasingly saturated 
the discourses of the time. 
In order to understand these ambivalences, one must try to grasp how actors 
vacillated between disputing and instrumentalizing regulations (or in other 
words between playing by the rules and playing on the rules). How can we 
distinguish purely opportunistic moves from deeply-rooted economic represen-
tations? In addition, we must break loose from the liberal grand narrative, be-
cause it always labels any form of certification as incongruous with economic 
reality, thus masking significant shifts in the way it was actually conducted in 
practice. In reality, not only the mode of control changed but also the very 
definition of quality: it was no longer an absolute but was becoming a relative 
value, the degrees of which corresponded to various sections of the market.7 
In the 1790s tanners complained increasingly often against inspections and 
inspectors: they longed for the ability to sell their products freely and directly 
and to thus bypass the Leadenhall market. Their petitions denounced nit-
picking, iniquitous and humiliating regulations: “the statute is oppressive, 
                                                             
5  Guildhall Library (London) mss. 7353/9, fol. 440, Jan. 29, 1807, petition of the tanners 
presented to the cordwainers’ company. 
6  See an extensive review of this very impressive study: Minard and Terrier (1994). See also 
Hirsch (1989). 
7  The pioneering article of Walter M. Stern (1968) which focused mainly in fact on the years 
1801-1808, never approaches the problem from that angle. Thus, it remains locked within a 
regulation/deregulation alternative which, in my opinion, misses part of the problem. 
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impolite and injust, and is wholly inapplicable to the present state of the leather 
manufacture”. It is not only “an engine of oppression,” but also “an engine of 
extortion,” with seizures, on account of alleged non-compliance with regula-
tions, which were actually only meant to bring further wealth to the inspectors:8 
“No benefit is derived to the public from this part of the statute. It oppresses the 
manufacturer and enriches the searchers & sealers, but the interest of the pub-
lic, which was the primary object of their appointment, is wholly abandoned.”9 
Third argument: rules that could have proven necessary in the past, when 
“manufacture was in its infancy,” have turned into an obstacle to its progress. 
Abstract norms, carved in the stone of regulations, forestall any technical inno-
vation; if they were observed, work practices would be fixed in their former 
and outdated state. 
Finally, tanners argued, against quality economy and the principle of official 
certification of products, that the buyer should be his own inspector, even that 
he is the best inspector one can imagine. First of all, they said, buyers are more 
informed than their predecessors; furthermore, nothing prevents the buyer from 
scrutinizing the goods himself: they are not sold on the basis of a sample but 
per item, and each one can assess on his own the quality and value of the prod-
uct:10 “Leather is not concealed in bales or casks, but every hide and every skin 
are separately exposed, and separately examined by the buyer, so that if any 
deception were attempted, it might be immediately detected.”11 
Each seller then, if he wants to be successful, will have to offer the best 
goods in order to secure his reputation and the fidelity of customers. Those who 
offer mediocre products will be rewarded with equally mediocre profit.12 Free 
                                                             
8  The National Archives (London, Kew. Hereafter TNA), BT 6/178, letter from Joseph 
Gutteridge, of Southwark and Samuel Purkis, of Brentford, January 1803. 
9  TNA BT 6/178, “Answers to the questions proposed by the right honourable the Lords of 
the Committee of Privy Council for Trade & Plantations to the tanners of London” (Joseph 
Gutteridge, James Warne, Samuel Purkis, Samuel Beddome); quotation: answers of the 
London tanners to questions 14 and 15. 
10  TNA BT 6/178, answers of the London tanners to questions 20 and 23, April 20, 1803. 
11  British Library, B 519 (9), Observations on the policy and expediency of repealing the 
statute 1st James I. Chap. 22, concerning tanners, curriers, shoemakers, etc., Brentford, 
1803. I guess the author is Samuel Purkis. Quotation p. 18-19.  
12  “We consider the credit & the profit of the manufacturers, & the competition there ever will 
be among them to excel, as the most effectual security the public can have for the 
production of good leather. The best commodity always command the highest price, and an 
inferior one carries its own punishment with it. The interest of the manufacturer is therefore 
inseparable from the interest of the public” (TNA BT 6/178, answers of the London tanners, 
question 18-April 20, 1803). “When a spirit of competition is universally excited – when 
the number of tanners is greatly multiplied, and everyone knows that the price of his article 
will be proportionated to its intrinsic value –, what greater security can we have for the 
production of the best commodity that can be made? (...) The worst of the article finds its 
level: if it be inferior in quality, the value is in proportion -and the reduction in price holds 
forth an instructive lesson for greater care and circumspection in future” (S. Purkis, Obser-
vations on the policy, op. cit., p. 18-19). 
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competition thus becomes the only guarantee that can effectively protect con-
sumers. Implicitly then, we can see the joint emergence of the notion of value 
for money and of the idea that unfair practices zero-sum one another. In these 
circumstances, the law-maker should not intervene in the exchanges between 
private, free and responsible actors. It also should not regulate the time skins 
have to bathe in the pit in order to be properly tanned, etc. Hence a conclusion 
which fits with the emerging laissez-faire discourse: 
Surely the tanner, the currier and the shoemaker must be aware that both their 
credit and interest depend on the goodness of their materials, and the 
excellence of their workmanship, and ought therefore to be allowed, like other 
persons, to conduct their own respective concerns.13 
So, “the very existence of such an office (of searchers), is, at this period, not 
only unncessary, but is an infringement of the common rights of a manufac-
turer”.14 
Confronting the tanners, the curriers and cordwainers companies put for-
ward two principles. First, they defend the principle of physical gathering and 
public display of the goods on the market place. They oppose any exchange 
concluded outside, “privately and clandestinely”: under their pen, these two 
terms are almost synonyms.15 Secondly, municipal inspection constitutes, in 
their opinion, the only means to guarantee the quality of goods, to protect the 
consumer against any deception on the part of the seller, and against any hid-
den defect: they thus pose as the guardians of the “public in general”: 
It is for the interest as well of the buyers of leather as to the publick in general 
that all tanned leather should be brought to a publick market to be searched 
and sealed before the same should be offered for sale”; and “we well know the 
experience that without such search the Public would be liable to the greatly 
imposed upon; seizures being frequently made of hides and skins either for 
not being thoroughly tanned or not thoroughly dried.16 
Of course, those who formulated these arguments were using them to 
strengthen their own position in the manufacturing process. It is in the curriers’ 
and cordwainers’ best interest to have their raw material controlled upstream, 
before they use it themselves. This is particularly true of cordwainers, because 
the currying of crust leather masked the defects that resulted from the preced-
ing tanning. Thus, it is first and precisely in the tan pit that the quality of 
                                                             
13  S. Purkis, Observations on the policy, op. cit., p. 27. 
14  S. Purkis, Observations on the policy, op. cit., p. 16. See also TNA BT 6/178, answers of 
London tanners to questions 23 and 24. 
15  Corporation of London Record office (hereafter CLRO), Court of Aldermen repertories 
(Rep), Rep 149, f 215-218, meeting of April 2, 1745. Petition of the “dealers and workers 
of leather, and other artificers, living within three miles of the city”, 1745. 
16  Guildhall Library (GL) mss. 7353/8, Cordwainers Court Minutes Book, f 182, 24 February 
1791; and 7353/9, f 213, June 1, 1803. Curriers supported the same proposal: GL 6113/3, 
Curriers Court Minutes Book, f 221, February 22, 1791, and PRO, BT 6/178, May 2, 1803. 
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leather is decided. On the market, buyers in bulk didn’t have time to control all 
the items on their own;17 in case of goods bought for export, any deceit could 
bring down the reputation of the entire London business. The most common 
form of deceit was to tamper with the weight of goods because the seller could 
easily play on the degree of humidity of tanned leather. Finally, the main con-
cern is about hoarding and monopoly, that is, about the balance of trading 
power on the market place: “when the article is scarce, the dealer would not 
only have to pay the advanced price but would be obliged to purchase the 
commodity in whatever state the tanner might think proper to bring it.”18 
Certification by inspectors thus appeared to protect the buyer by preventing an 
imbalance of trading power in favor of the reseller: it made it impossible for the 
latter to benefit from relative shortages by attempting to sell poor quality items 
at the high price. 
For all these reasons, municipal inspection appears, from the point of view 
of curriers, as an indispensable shield. Inspection on the market, right after 
leather had left the tanneries, reduced uncertainties about the quality of the 
product. 
These arguments did not convince the parlementary committee of the House 
of Commons, which, in 1803, advocated the abolition of the leather inspec-
tion.19 However, it survived until 1808. 
The matter dragged on because of a contrary lobbying campaign that sought 
at the very same moment to establish new controls. In the context of this 
campaign (and here is not the least of its paradoxes), the former opponents 
united against a third category: the leather trades then acted as a block in order 
to impose on butchers, their suppliers, an inspection of the skins as they left the 
slaughterhouses.  
4. The Flaying Acts 
Complaints against butchers about the cutting up of animals were very old: any 
damage caused to the skin at this stage was irreparable. An awkward stab in the 
belly of the animal and the entire skin was fated to be cut to pieces because the 
middle gash would make it impossible to make a large single piece. But the 
worst were irregularities in the thickness of the skin, because the thinner parts 
would dry faster after the tanning and would prove more fragile with use. All 
                                                             
17  Glove makers of Worcester made this argument their own in a petition to the Commons in 
1808, but this time about the skins inspection: Commons Journals, 63, p. 243, April 6, 
1808. 
18  TNA BT 6/178, answer to the curriers, May 2, 1803, question 6.  
19  PRO, BT 6/178, anonymous report, copy made by the secretary of the Board of Trade 
(1803). 
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along the 18th century, petitions thus demanded a law “to prevent butchers’ ill 
flaying of hides and skins.” In 1800, a new campaign was launched. 
Tensions in the leather market, combined with the difficulties in supplying 
that resulted from the soaring demand of leather items for the military and the 
decreasing production since 1796, probably encouraged artisans to mobilize 
across the country. Thus, in just four months, without much debate and despite 
the butchers’ subsequent counter-attack, a municipal inspection of skins was 
born. London, however, was not immediately concerned. Only in 1803 was a 
specific system established in the capital, following a request from workers in 
the field and despite their divisions.20 This time indeed, tanners agree with 
curriers and cordwainers: the Flaying Acts are of interest to all of them because 
they displace control to an earlier stage in the production chain: thanks to this 
new inspection they could, as buyers, do away with controlling on their own 
the state of the skins offered by their suppliers (even though they also continue 
to call for the abolition of the 1604 law on tanned leather: therefore the alliance 
between them is tactical and incidental and explains that the same tanners who 
fight to make the regulation on leather work disappear, find themselves 
involved in the movement that demands a control of skins upon leaving the 
slaughterhouse). 
Table 1: The Flaying Acts 
Date Law Main measures 
1800 39-40 Geo III, c. 66 creation of the skins inspection (except in London) 
1801 41 Geo. III, c. 53 reduction of the amount of fines 
1803 43 Geo., c. 106 (local) specific application for London 
1808 48 Geo. III, c. 71 reorganization of the inspection in London, reduction of the amount of fines 
1824 5 Geo. IV, c. 57 abolition of the skins inspection 
 
Let’s turn back to the skins inspection. Butchers practicing within a 5 mile 
radius around London must bring the skins on the markets (within 10 days after 
flaying) where they are examined by inspectors who affixed a mark on them in 
exchange for a modest payment. 
Two main features characterize this system: 
1) First, it is based on a strictly equal representation of each company. Indeed, 
the 16 inspectors and 4 arbitrators in charge of scrutinizing the 4 butchery 
markets (half of the butchers went to the main one, Leadenhall)21 were 
                                                             
20  Local and Personal Acts, 43 George III, cap. 106, July 4, 1803: “An act (…) relating to the 
use of horse hides in making boots and shoes and preventing the damaging of raw hides 
and skins in the flaying thereof to (...).” 
21  There were eight inspectors at Leadenhall (for cows’ and horses’ skins), four at Woods 
Close, two at Southwark and at Whitechapel (for sheep). 
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nominated by the city council, which had to choose from the list of names 
put forward by the companies and follow fixed quotas: half of the positions 
for the butchers’ company, one fourth for that of the cordwainers’ company, 
one fourth for the curriers’ company. Tanners were excluded from this 
system since they did not constitute a company. Overall, the inspection was 
only municipal in appearence since, in practice, it was managed jointly by 
the three companies, on a rather surprising basis of equal and collective 
negotiation: representatives of the three companies met as the flaying 
committee, irregularly but sometimes frequently when particular problems 
arose, notably when collected fines needed to be redistributed (in theory, 
one half of the amount collected would go to the inspectors, and the other 
half would be split between the three companies in proportion to their 
representation in the instution – e.g. 50% for the butchers – and they would 
use that money to pay the four arbitrators).22 Joint management within this 
permanent committee had its limits however, and the butchers’ company 
ended up pulling out of it (actually, it seems that the company rapidly found 
itself in a difficult position, because butchers who were not members – and 
it seems that they were many and organized – complained that it 
collaborated with leather craftsmen and cashed in on a disguised tax system 
imposed on the butcher trade). Thus, those butchers with no membership 
goaded the company into breaking off with the other organized trades sitting 
on the committee.  
2) In addition to this rather original system of joint management among the 
companies, one must stress that the Flaying Acts also revealed a radical shift 
in the very conception of quality control. Two major breaks became 
effective, although none of the actors involved had explicitly formulated 
them. 
The first break had to do with the definition of quality. Skins inspectors were 
on the look-out for skins that were poorly cut up or damaged by the knife of 
unscrupulous butchers (“ill flaying,” “cutting and gashing of hides”), but no 
specific text defined the criteria to distinguish between proper and improper 
flaying: one can guess this was about gashes and the regularity of the thickness 
of skins, but no rule codified the butcher’s gesture. In other words, contrary to 
tanning, for which regulations defined the order and duration of the operations, 
as well as the proper method to follow for each stage of the process, the quality 
of skins could only be assessed by the subjective judgment of the inspectors, 
without any reference to a written rule. Inspectors referred to customary 
gestures to define standards but had no rule in hand. The only tools at their 
disposal are their own expertise and their capacity of collective deliberation. 
                                                             
22  GL 14338: “Flaying committee”, 95 pages register, stopped on June 9, 1808, when the law 
was revised and the inspection regime modified. 
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The second characteristic feature of the skins inspection is equally as 
important. The law led to a clearcut partition of the market. This time indeed, 
goods are not seized: they just bear a mark indicating their good or poor 
quality, and in the latter case their price is downgraded. Skins marked with a 
“D” (for “damaged”) or an “S” (for “sound”) measured up to two distinct 
ranges of quality (hence of price), now clearly differentiated for the buyers. 
Quality then, is no longer an absolute; it becomes a relative order and can have 
degrees. From a conceptual point of view, this is a major break. We can assume 
that certification is then used on the market to lessen uncertainties, since the 
mark attached to the product recorded, and at the same time displayed, the 
distinction between two scales of quality. The certified information thus 
provided to the buyer could result in an increased trust that could in turn loosen 
circulation on the market. In practice, we can assume that the 
institutionalization of an openly identified inferior category led to the 
introduction of poor quality skins on the leather circuit, which, in the past, 
would have been thrown on the scrapheap and only used, for instance, to make 
glue.  
In any case, one can say that if the creation of the skins inspection in the 
kingdom, and two years later its extension to London, could have seemed out 
of place, running counter to a general tendency towards deregulation, it was not 
at all lacking in economic rationality. This regulation, it seems to me, can be 
compared to the “système intermédiaire” established in France for the textile 
industry by the minister Necker in 1779 (Minard 2000 and Minard 1998, 321-
326). It was an option system: the manufacturer could choose to either present 
cloth he had made according to the rules to a “bureau de marque” where the 
competent officer, after reckoning the items complied with current 
specifications, would affix a “marque de règlement,” or declare his production 
nonstandard (“arbitrary” was the word used at the time), and his cloth would 
receive the “marque de liberté.” In practice, this was the same as distinguishing 
between top, middle and bottom of the range, because it was mainly the top of 
the range production, often destined for export, that needed the guarantee 
offered by the official certification. Thus were created two clearly identified 
trading circuits, and the existence of a distinct “free” zone precisely reinforced 
the trust in the certification in use in the regulated zone. In this dual system it is 
possible to escape the regulated/free alternative and address the different 
requirements of distinct markets. But in the leather case we are dealing with, 
what is noticeable is the fact that these requirements were constantly 
reassessed: the two distinct ranges of quality (“S” and “D” skins) didn’t result 
from the manufacturers’ choices and declarations but from inspectors’s 
appreciations, whose criterias could be flexible according to the commercial 
situation. So, overall, there was a shift from “regulated” quality to “delibera-
ted” quality.  
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Here the conceptualization provided by the school of the Economics of 
Convention proves very enlightening.23 This school proposes to analyze the 
foundations and origins of the agreement which, in any given society, institutes 
and legitimizes the market, as well as the description of the objects to which 
this founding convention applies. However, it also seeks to study the descrip-
tion of the rules through which this convention is objectified by implicated 
agents, constituting the normative and cognitive framework available to them 
for obtaining the knowledge based on which they will make their decisions and 
act. In other words, because of the incompleteness of contracts in situations of 
uncertainty, the coordination of activities demands certain points of reference 
that can be collectively acknowledged, since they have been elaborated through 
an interactive dynamic. Conventions open up the possibility of finding practical 
solutions to uncertainty by authorizing reciprocal expectations about the com-
petence and behaviour of other actors (Minard 2011). 
In the present case, indeed, we can see that quality has become pure 
convention, resulting from the agreement of inspectors who represent both 
“parties” involved: sellers and buyers, butchers and leather craftsmen. This is 
the reason why the joint management of the inspection with collective 
responsibility was so important: without it, it would be impossible to reach the 
conventional agreement that could only result from deliberation by the parties 
involved. Contrary to written rules that freeze professional practices in their 
specific state at the time of codification, “deliberated” convention was flexible 
and adaptable (one can guess that the criteria used varied depending on market 
conditions and the level of demand). The skins inspection is thus not of the 
exact same nature as the previous leather inspection. 
5. The Abolition of Inspections 
In the years 1806-1808, the overlapping of two separate debates, that of the 
leather inspection and that of the skin inspection, made the situation look rather 
confused. In both cases, of course, great principles were called upon, and once 
again in both cases, the relevance and legitimity of quality control were 
measured up against the merits of laissez-faire. But the collision between two 
concomitant battles sometimes led to strange battles where the front-lines were 
inverted. Let’s consider the arguments of butchers against the skins inspectors: 
incompetence (although half of them are butchers!), self-interested bias 
because inspectors cashed the tax on the mark and received a share of the 
fines,24 bias of the arbitrators as well, since their salary was based on the fines 
                                                             
23  See the special issue of Revue économique 40/2 (1989), and Orléan (1994, 9-40), Salais 
(1998, 255-292), Favereau and Lazega (2002, 213-252). 
24  In March 1805, butchers demanded that the inspectors received fixed wages, in addition to 
the tax on the mark, and instead of a percentage of fines. From the point of view of curriers 
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that went to their company.25 Butchers also disputed the obligation to bring the 
skins to the market, a useless loss of time and a restriction to the free practice 
of their trade. Finally, in their opinion, it was the responsibility of the buyer to 
evaluate the quality of goods and as a result to set a starting price for 
negotiation. They also put two additional arguments forward: gashes and other 
damages made to the skins during the flaying cannot be avoided, buyers know 
it and then buy for a lower price; the fines system endangers apprenticeship, 
because the lack of experience of a beginner ends up costing a lot of money to 
his master. 
These are the same arguments tanners (who favored the inspection of skins) 
used, but against the inspection of leather. The two other companies involved 
in the debate are led to define their own priorities. For the cordwainers, the 
most serious threat is the questioning of the norms of manufacturing and of the 
certification of leather. As for the curriers, they end up splitting with the 
cordwainers: they seem to have made a strategic choice to defend the in-
spection of skins, which, from their point of view, was as important as that of 
leather. 
The new petitioning campaign launched by the tanners in 1807 in favor of 
the abolition of the leather inspection first focused debates. 
A Select Committee then reported back to the House of Commons. Like the 
one of 1803, this committee is overall in favor of liberalization. But their 
written report deserves closer attention.26 
They clearly distinguished two aspects. First of all, the transformation of 
standards of production and of method prescriptions into rules: “Those regula-
tions are contrary to the principles of sound policy, and no public advantage 
can result from their enforcement.” There is no reason to uphold these manu-
facturing rules as long as public safety is not threatened. The craftsman alone, 
not the law-maker, can know what treatment to apply, depending on the fea-
tures of the material at hand, since in any case, even the most inexperienced 
buyer will recognize the quality and the possible defects of the final product. 
Which brings us to the second aspect: that of the procedures for quality control. 
According to the report, abuses appeared with the resumption of seizures in 
London. Inspectors are overwhelmed by the sheer mass of goods and are led to 
seize whole batches of leather for one or two nonstandard pieces. The commit-
tee deemed such practices unfair and humiliating and pointed to the fact that 
“the interest of the artificer is the best security to the public.” 
                                                                                                                                
and shoemakers, this would defy the logic of the system: GL 14338, p. 26; GL 7353/9, p. 
322. The same proposal was put forward in 1806, but without success. 
25  GL 10557, petition of “some of the principal butchers” of London, Westminster, Southwark 
and within a 15 miles radius, February 1808. 
26  “Report from the Select Committee on Acts relating to tanners, curriers, shoemakers and 
other artificers occupying the cutting of leather etc.”, House of Commons Parliamentary 
Papers, 1807, vol. II, p. 295-309. 
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Reporters on the committee however, confess that the question of control is 
not in itself a matter of principle and can be as well a matter of opportunity: 
they concede that it is necessary to regulate in certain situations, when “fraudu-
lent practices represent a danger, if we are to follow the natural course of the 
market.” With great technical precision the report thus distinguishes situations 
in which control is just a convenient device offered to the buyer (such is the 
case for the drying of skins and the varying weight that depended on the degree 
of humidity: fraud was possible but easily identified) from the situations whose 
outcome had a bearing on the “final consumer,” who did not always have the 
means to evaluate the actual quality of the product. On the one hand, “the in-
termediate artificer,” who can’t be fooled that easily; on the other hand “the 
unskillful consumer,” “the public at large,” who can’t know if the leather used 
by the cordwainer was sufficiently tanned and if the shoe will last. The same 
goes for exports, also the object of numerous deceptions. In conclusion: “It 
may be advisable for the purpose of upholding the reputation of our export 
trade, to continue a penalty upon leather insufficiently tanned, and perhaps 
upon boots and shoes made of sheep-skin, which are deceitful articles, and not 
easily distinguishable by the purchaser”. 
The committee’s recommendation is twofold. On the one hand, it proposes 
to abolish all manufacturing rules, to cancel the obligation to go through the 
market place, the leather inspection and any form of inquisitorial visit of work-
shops.27 On the other hand, it proposed to establish new rules, “which will 
effectually secure the purchasers of leather without being oppressive to the 
manufacturer.” 
The 1808 law only kept the first constituent of the committee’s proposal.28 
Tanners had finally won their case: the leather inspection was dead. Thus this 
episode could fit nicely in the teleological narrative of liberalism. But it must 
be stressed that the deputies of the Commons voted a truncated proposal.29 And 
it would be a mistake to throw away to the dump of History the second con-
stituent of the report’s final proposal, because it contained a remarkable institu-
tional innovation which constituted precisely an integral part of the nuanced 
approach of the committee to the problem of commercial deception. The pro-
posal was twofold. 
                                                             
27  “A periodical search of the premises of the currier and cordwainer, for the purpose of 
seizure and confiscation, as enjoined by the Act of James, must be either nugatory or ex-
tremely irksome and oppressive.” 
28  48 Geo III, cap 60, June 1, 1808: “An Act for repealing an Act passed in the first year of 
King James I (...).” 
29  And this is exactly what happened in France in September 1791: the Assemblée nationale 
voted the first constituent of Goudard’s report (abolition of manufacturing regulations and 
of manufactures inspection), without debating the second constituent: the transfer of the 
regulating power to local administrations! See Minard (2007, 86), and Minard (1998, 351-
361). 
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First of all, the quality of the leather on sale on the market remains subject 
to expertise, but the assessment is not tied to any norm. As with the skins under 
the Flaying Acts, the collegial verdict of the inspectors, the assessment of their 
majority, fixes the standard and decides whether the leather is “sufficiently 
tanned” and “sufficiently dry.” The committee proposes to establish a joint 
structure, made up of six examiners, representing both parties involved, sellers 
and buyers: 3 tanners, and 3 leather craftsmen, elected by their fellow crafts-
men at Leadenhall market. No companies involved here, but a vote by profes-
sional college. It is worth noticing that, for the first time, tanners are repre-
sented among the inspectors (renamed examiners). In order to guarantee a 
majority vote, a seventh examiner was co-opted by the six others. A fine was 
imposed on seized leathers and these had to be reworked. 
Regarding the concept of quality, two lessons can be drawn from this pro-
ject. First of all, in the committee’s opinion, it was a fact that the ability to 
distinguish between poor and good material was unevenly shared in the current 
buying conditions. Secondly, in the committee’s project, quality was the object 
of a conventional construction, it resulted from the encounter of practices that 
were socially accepted by both parties involved, and it was formalized through 
the joint deliberation of the examiners. This is exactly the same process as we 
encountered with the skins inspection under the Flaying Acts. It means that 
there is no such thing as quality in itself, in the sense that, beyond the objective 
physical characteristics of the product, the quality is always defined inside a 
situated context by the actors of the exchange: quality is in every case an ap-
preciated quality. 
Second constituent of their project: sale on the market is no longer manda-
tory, but those who bought outside the market would have the possibility to 
have their goods examined within three days of the sale. 
Table 2: Project of a Reformed Leather Inspection (1807) 
Control 
Location 
Before the sale After the sale 
Market mandatory possible 
Direct sale none possible 
 
If deception on the weight is proven, or if the items are defective, the seller 
would have to rework them, at his own cost. This original form of on-demand 
expertise was risky for those who requested it: if the alleged fraud was 
confirmed the seller would have to pay a 20 shillings fine, but in the contrary 
case, the buyer had to pay. The fine somehow paid for the examiners’ call-out 
fee, regardless of their verdict. 
The whole system could have seemed restrictive, actually not as much 
because of what it prescribed than because of its mode of practical application. 
In fact, the proposal went unheeded. But it reveals how seriously the reporters 
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– who were completely won over to the idea of abolishing manufacturing rules 
– took the hypothesis of deception and the risk of hidden defect. It is clear that 
in their view, and contrary to the liberal conviction on this matter, unfair trade 
practices did not automatically cancel one another. They deemed it necessary to 
expose suppliers to the threat of control and financial sanction, because they 
doubted that their allegedly obvious self-interest (to keep one’s customers) 
would be enough to guarantee complete fairness. 
Nonetheless, in spite of this reasoning, in 1808 the parliament simply and 
completely abolished the leather inspection, without further discussion about 
the second constituent of the committee’s proposal, to the great satisfaction of 
tanners. 
As for the skins inspection, it survived by dint of slight changes that were 
voted upon in 1808 (decrease of the amount of fines and integration of the 
butchers who were not members of the company). However, it was finally 
abolished in 1824, after a new campaign of petitioning and counter-petitioning 
that those among the butchers who opposed any kind of inspection ended up 
winning. It is true that, at that time, scarcity caused by wartime demand was 
released. 
6. Conclusions 
What is worth remembering in all this? On a first level, it appears that the 
question of opportunism is a serious problem for actors. Many doubt that 
competition led to a systematic zero-summing of unfair practices. Hence the 
attachment to certain forms of control in order to protect oneself. 
In the case of skins and leather, the control is not exerted on the final 
product, it happens in the middle of the manufacturing process and thus did not 
concern the consumer directly: here, the reasoning about the interest of a 
“public” who, unknowing of the internal qualities of the product, needed 
protection against hidden defects, is irrelevant. The matter is debated here 
among knowledgeable professionnals. The stakes are different: the goal is to 
build up as much guarantee as possible when dealing with raw material 
suppliers. Alliances as well as disputes between professionals in the field are 
dictated by one’s position in the commercial chain: tanners wanted to impose a 
skins inspection on butchers, and they had no objection to the fact that the 
cordwainers company scrutinize the manufacturing of shoes,30 but they 
couldn’t stand to have their own production controlled. These attitudes can be 
interpreted as a sort of play on rules that everyone practiced in the hope of 
imposing on his supplier the control he didn’t want to see taking place between 
                                                             
30  GL 7353/9, Cordwainers minute book, p. 501-503, July 6, 1808, report on a meeting with 
the tanners’ representatives. 
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him and his customers. The goal of this game is to be able to enjoy the 
potential benefits of certification upstream in the production chain while 
refusing to see it imposed just downstream of one’s position. Seen from that 
angle, it seems that actions are all part of strategic behaviors used by actors in 
order to optimize norms to their benefit. Indeed, many discourses and explicit 
claims, through petitions for instance, by different groups of artisans, accord 
with this vision and show how powerful was the ideological framework of 
market competition. 
But this purely instrumental vision of certification, norms and procedures 
might seem a bit narrow, in the sense that it doesn’t really take seriously the 
representations of quality that actors mobilized. For instance, in the case of 
tanners, their rejection of older regulations of the manufacturing process 
(tanning methods, ingredients, duration of the bath in the pit, etc.) doesn’t mean 
that they consider the idea of regulating work and exchanges as inept. They 
display the same distrust as many others towards intermediaries, often called 
“speculators,” who create disturbances on the commercial circuits and push the 
prices up.31 Certainly instrumentalized (monopoly is always the feat of others), 
the use of the anti-speculation scheme reflects however a notion of “honesty” 
in exchanges, and this notion is not neutral. Similarly, the notion of quality 
remains, in the world of crafts, a fundamental constitutive element of trade 
pride: good work attracts others’ respect and fosters self-esteem. Thus, in so far 
as they revolve around issues of convictions, self-representations, and ideology, 
these questions cannot be reduced to purely strategic calculations. For this 
reason, among others, the laissez-faire doctrine could meet certain forms of 
resistance: beyond practical questions and the real conditions of actual markets 
that pointed to the utopian nature of the perfect market scheme, production and 
exchange activities are underlied by representations, culture, images, concep-
tions of oneself and of the world, of what should, needed, or had to be done. 
All of this explains that the problems of the social organization of trust, by 
economic agents or various political authorities, should be taken seriously. To 
approach these problems as an instance of the simple liberty/control opposition 
would be both simplistic and superficial. Similarly, interpreting them in terms 
of strategic action and rational choice turns out to be quite reductionist. One 
should rather imagine the exchange resting on the construction of some form of 
agreement. 
The example of leather and skins just revealed a double shift in the 
conception of product certification. First we saw a shift from the notion of 
“regulated” quality to that of “deliberated” quality, the latter implying a collec-
tive judgment, and thus necessarily, for reasons of equity, a rather original 
structure to allow joint assessment. The second shift is that from an absolute 
                                                             
31  Comments reported by the committee of 1807: “Report from the Select Committee on Acts 
relating to tanners, curriers, shoemakers (...): Appendix ”, HCPP, 1807, vol. II, p. 298. 
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definition of the intrisic quality of the product, measured up against a standard, 
to a relativistic conception, that ratified the circulation of goods that belonged 
to different ranges of quality. The distinction between a top and a bottom range 
aptly manifests the shift from an economy of quality to an economy of 
identification that could tolerate variations, as long as these were clear to the 
buyer. In this new regime of coordination, norms are no longer prescriptions 
but become models of reference which are internal to action. The regulative 
institution is no longer a coercive framework aimed at limiting the effects of 
opportunistic behaviour but becomes a way of adjudicating for conflicts and a 
means of coordination and adjustment (Thévenot 2002). 
The still-born alternative devised by the deputies of the 1807 committee 
bespeaks the sensitivity of political leaders regarding this issue, even if, 
eventually, market ideology reveals itself to be stronger and the majority in the 
Commons didn’t capture such subtleties. The sources don’t allow us to guess to 
what extent the workers in the field were divided: many espoused the trend of 
laissez-faire ideology and managed to get rid of any kind of inspection. But 
beside those who endorsed the model of pure market coordination, stood others 
who advocated for some conventional coordination. The fact that the whole 
regulative framework was eventually repealed in 1824 shouldn’t lead us to 
under-estimate the divisions among practitioners, and the co-existence of 
various regimes of coordination they could put into action. 
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